Standardization and Intellectual Property Rights: ETSI's controversial search for new IPR-procedures by Iversen, EJ
 
Standardization and Intellectual Property Rights:  
ETSI’s controversial search for new IPR-procedures 
 
 
Eric J. Iversen 
The STEP-Group 
ericiv@step.no
 
© 1999 IEEE.  Reprinted, with permission 
(from K. Jakobs, R. Williams (Eds.), SIIT’99 Proceedings . (IEEE Conference on Standardisation and 
Innovation), held in Aachen, Germany, 99-09- 15/17.) IEEE, ISBN 0-7803-9935-8.”) 
 
http://www-i4.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/~jakobs/siit99/home.html
 
Abstract 
 
During the early 1990s, several international 
standards development organizations including the 
IEEE re-approached how they deal with intellectual 
property rights. The search for new procedures by 
SDOs is a function of comprehensive institutional and 
market changes associated with the rapidly evolving 
ICT field. The changes affect both how formal 
standardization and how IPRs work in this field. In 
this note, the changing relationship between SDOs 
and IPRs will be approached in terms of the 
protracted controversy that has surrounded ETSI’s 
attempt to depart from traditional IPR procedures in 
favor of more detailed ones. This case-study 
incorporates many of the forces marking the changing 
ICT-field  that contribute to the ‘new environment for 
standardization’. The study is based on interviews and  
a study of the theoretic and institutional literature. 
 
Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights, Stan
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In November 1994, the General Assembly of the 
European Telecommunications Standardization 
Institute (ETSI) adopted an IPR Policy after more than 
five years of divisive debate.1 This was the second 
time the 6 year-old institute had adopted a policy 
addressing the risk that the development of technical 
standards might strand on proprietary technology. The 
previous policy, which had been adopted in March 
1993 after 4 years of debate within the institute, had 
been abandoned in the face of strong legal and 
political resistance. What otherwise might have 
discounted as an institution’s internal procedures 
became the subject of a legal Complaint lodged under 
                                                          
1 See the notice (95/C 76/05) in the EU Official 
Journal (28.3.1995).    
EU’s competitive law; further, it led to a series of 
formal protests from ETSI members threatening to 
quit the formative institute. Moreover it became the 
subject of intense political pressure from the USA and 
a series of diplomatic incidents which is rumored to 
have included the executive level. The ‘93 policy like 
its follow-up was only an ‘interim measure’. 
The exceptional proportions of this controversy and 
the fact that it was sparked by changes in the internal 
procedures of a ‘voluntary’ organization is quite 
striking. It is the more striking in light of the minimal 
procedures that had been developed by other SDOs to 
deal with an eventuality of which they had had no real 
experience. In this paper, we will investigate this 
controversy and argue that the relationship between 
intellectual property rights and standards development 
organizations is under strain as a function of the 
changing ICT environment. We note here that other 
SDOs including the reformed ITU-T and the IEEE 
were at the same time re-evaluating their IPR 
procedures. We will also consider aspects of ETSI 
itself that have made compounded the IPR risk.  
A. The inherent tension 
The relationship between IPR-regimes and SDOs is a 
complex and a changing relationship. Underlying it, 
however, is an essential opposition. In this section, we 
shall focus on this essential opposition to the exclusion 
of the complexity of the interactive and dynamic 
relationship in order to present the conflict it gives rise 
to. 
The inherent tension between SDOs and IPRs grows 
out of the fact that these institutions perform functions 
that are— in terms of the innovation process—
complementary to one another. According to 
conventional analysis, IPRs (particularly patents) are 
generally envisioned as ‘appropriation mechanisms’ 
whose dominant characteristic it is to create an 
incentive for private R&D where the market does not. 
[e.g. Arrow, 1962]  As a result, IPRs are most 
characteristically identified as a promoter of a 
diversity of technological ideas. Formal 
standardization is found in the opposite corner in this 
purely schematic presentation. SDOs characteristically 
function as ‘selection mechanisms’ to narrow the 
diversity of network technologies in order that the 
industry can take advantage of network externalities 
[e.g. David, 1987]. Ideally, they work in the collective 
interest of all actors. 
IPRs and SDOs can therefore be said to hold key 
positions in the innovation process, where this process 
is envisioned in quasi-evolutionary terms. In this 
view, “evolution is the result of two seemingly 
contradictory processes: the creation of variety and its 
successive reduction through selection. Effective 
long-term adaptation requires that these two processes 
be kept in balance.” [Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1994] 
In general terms, IPR-regimes are construed as 
facilitating the continuous generation of technical 
variety. However, because, “Variety conveys 
efficiencies in specialization and customization that 
are offset by the failure to achieve network 
externalities and other economies of scale,” 
[Steinmueller, 1995] a complementary role is needed. 
In order to achieve the network externalities in a 
timely manner, standards development organizations 
act to select from a ripening variety of technological 
solutions. Thus, "In reducing diversity, 
standardization curtails the potentialities for the 
formation of new combinations and the regeneration 
of variety from which further selection will be 
possible." [David, 1995]  
The complementary roles of IPRs and SDOs in this 
sense generate forcefields of opposition. At one level, 
these forcefields play the private interest of the 
inventor off against the collective interest of the 
industry. More fundamentally, the opposition involves 
the promotion of technological variety as against the 
facilitation of  a certain uniformity. In practice, 
however,  the interaction between these roles is 
mitigated by a number of mechanisms—formal or 
not—that help to insure their coordination. In the 
changing climate of the telecommunications industry, 
however, it appears increasingly difficult to maintain a 
state of balance. 
B. A theoretical conflict 
In concrete terms, the tension in the relationship 
emerges when the development of a standard 
unavoidably infringes a patent or other industrial IPR. 
The emergence of such “essential IPRs” is so called 
because the implementation of a standard, by its 
essence, necessitates the application of proprietary 
technology. The standards body risks infringing the 
rights of those companies who have invested valuable 
R&D resources in this field if the standard ‘specs’ it 
proposes, by their depth and detail, necessitate the use 
of technical solutions that are protected by active 
property rights, such as patents. Should it do so, the 
collective interest of the industry in a standard 
confronts the private interests of an IPR holder.  
The discovery of essential patents has not been a 
frequent occurrence. In most case, this occurrence is 
one that can be settled peacefully, either through 
tweaking the standards or, alternately, through 
different licensing arrangements. In the latter 
situation, however, there is the possibility that the 
situation will become strained where the cumulative 
royalty costs of these licenses threaten the 
technology’s marketability. A more serious but in 
many ways more remote situation involves the case in 
which the IPR-holder, for some reason, refuses to 
license his technology in terms which the collective 
interests in the SDO find acceptable. This case of 
“blocking IPRs” is rare because the property-rights 
holder generally benefits greatly when his rights are 
implicated by a standard. It is nonetheless a factor, 
and in cases where a mandatory standard is involved, 
such as the GSM case 2, it is particularly unwelcome 
factor because a conflict between legal objectives 
become involved to which there is no obvious legal 
recourse available.  
There is therefore scope for conflict and the 
ramifications of such conflicts can be serious. 
However, despite this scope, the risk has until recently 
been written off as an academic concern faced by 
voluntary SDOs. Indeed, there has been no record that 
voluntary SDOs—which have existed in different 
industries for about a century—had before now 
experienced a difficult conflict with an IPR holder. 
There are several reasons for this. The main set of 
reasons is that, the way industry standardization has 
historically been conducted in the case of 
telecommunications simply did not raise the problem. In 
general, international standardization was long a 
matter of codifying technologies [Cargill, 1989]  that 
had become de facto standards and of providing for 
interoperability between different national systems at 
relevant interfaces. In this case, standards were based 
deliberately on proprietary material: there was little 
danger of essential IPRs unexpectedly arising.  In 
Europe,  national standards that were typically 
sponsored by the PTT did not provoke IPR problems 
because the potential problem was left up to its 
suppliers (i.e. the national champions). This was the 
situation of  “have-made rights” whereby the PTT 
developed technical parameters which it gave to its 
“national champion” to fill. It fell upon the equipment 
supplier to clear any IPRs it ran across developing that 
technology.  This particular practice meant that these 
national-champions were in fact loath to patent results 
of their R&D activity, because this complicated their 
collaboration with the PTT. 
International standardization is no longer a matter of 
simply codifying existing technologies. As the decade 
long standardization of the GSM-system testifies, 
standardization can involve considerable efforts to 
build large technical systems. In general, 
standardization has more recently begun working in 
                                                          
2 Iversen, 1999. This section borrows from this work. 
front of the market in the hopes of arriving at more 
timely standards. At the same time, standardization is 
no longer a case of ‘have-made rights’, as the number 
of actors involved have been multiplied by the re-
regulation of the telecoms industry. It is in this 
environment that the potential for disputes involving 
IPRs begins to be real.  
II. THE EMERGENCE OF CONFLICT THAT 
ACCOMPANIED THE BIRTH OF ETSI 
At its inception in 1988/89, ETSI insisted that it was 
born into a “new environment of European 
standardization” [Tuckett, 1993] in which emerging 
standards would be “littered with IPRs”. Although the 
fledgling institute later estimated that the IPR-problem 
would only involve about 2% of its standards work 
[ETSI document, 1994], the perception that the danger 
had ceased to be an academic problem encouraged it 
to seek new measures to tackle the eventuality. Alas, it 
was not alone in this prognosis in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. International voluntary SDOs like the 
former CCITT [now ITU-t] also recognized but 
‘avoided the temptation’ of defining procedures to 
address the potentially damaging IPR problem.  
There was therefore a common recognition that ICT-
standards had entered a “new environment”.  Several 
aspects of the evolving ICT-field and the way SDOs 
work in it do suggest an increased exposure to the 
IPR-problem. In general, conditions such as the 
accelerated pace of innovation, its increasing 
complexity, the changing shape of markets, the 
changing ranks and positions of actors and, not least, 
changing geopolitical conditions, all contribute to 
making the problem both more probable and more 
damaging for technical innovation. The proliferation of 
more and more complex technology itself invites 
conflict between IPRs and SDOs. Accelerated technical 
complexity encourages  more specific standardization 
of the interface abutting functional entities. This 
situation arises from the need for ensuring acceptable 
levels of interoperability between technologies that are 
increasing different and increasingly far away. By the 
same token, however, there tend to be greater 
concentrations of IPRs in areas of greater technical 
complexity. Thus it becomes increasingly difficult to 
adopt a standard without incorporating proprietary 
material. Further there is an increased tendency to 
standardize more aspects of a technology, for example 
whole technical systems as with GSM. Again, the 
objective is to ensure system-integrity but the result 
may be to implicate a greater number of IPRs.This 
however risks  exposure to different types of IPRs, like 
“systems-patents." Lastly the pace of change means that 
the industry needs standards more and it needs them 
more and more quickly. The realization that an IPR 
exists might take some time. Meanwhile, the delay and 
potential repudiation of an important standard because 
of IPR complications may mean a section of the 
industry might miss its window of opportunity. This 
means that the standardization process is wasted.  
A. ETSI’s departure from normal practices. 
In addition to these general characteristics of the ICT-
field and how standardization functions in it, there are 
some specific characteristics about ETSI that inclined it 
to embrace the ‘temptation’ and re-address the question. 
First, there is the need to push markets over national 
borders which has entailed ‘mandatory standardization’ 
and thus increased vulnerability to ‘blocking patents’. 
The mandatory classification entails that the only access 
to the market is through reference to that standard. The 
prospects of monopoly that arise here serve to grant the 
IPR holder increased leverage vis-à-vis the market. 
There is of course recourse to art. 86 in the Treaty of 
Rome if the holder is found to have abusively exercised 
his IPR. As the relevant European policy is formative 
and the legal procedures anyway expensive, 
complicated and protracted, this mechanism provides 
limited security to parties reliant on the successful 
launch of ‘mandatory' standards. 
This concern provided the basis for ETSI’s departure 
from normal practices. In addition, ETSI inherited what 
was perhaps the first case in which the IPR-problem had 
arisen, during the standardization of GSM. [cf. Iversen, 
1999] This experience provided the spur to look for a 
new approach. Finally, its status as a formally new 
institute provided the opportunity to qualitatively change 
approaches to the touchy IPR question faced in 
increasing degree by the standardization community at 
large. One of the most tangible reasons however was the 
broadening of the SDO's membership from including 
only PTT’s of the CEPT system to including a range of 
equipment-suppliers including those with home-markets 
elsewhere.  
III. ETSI CASE-SURVEY 
It was this move towards a new approach to IPRs to 
fit the new environment that initiated a protracted 
controversy within the new institute and without. In 
many senses, ETSI’s protracted drive for new 
procedures was inherited from the CEPT organization 
from which it was hived off in 1988. The link is most 
direct in that it was a CEPT working group, GSM-5. 
This group had been set up to monitor and deal with 
the IPR questions that had begun to emerge during the 
comprehensive standardization of GSM and was 
transferred from the parent organization in 1989.  
When GSM-5 set about to redraft IPR-procedures 
concurrent with the GSM-dispute or in its immediate 
aftermath, it was against the backdrop of an 
experience that indicated that IPR-holders were not 
necessarily willing to license their technologies in 
terms dictated by the PTTs3. Subsequently, other 
                                                          
3 This experience involved an American equipment 
supplier, Motorola, had initially refused to commit to 
the GSM Memorandum of Understanding. Motorola 
has argued that it did so because of the nature of its 
markets and the lack of market-elasticities. Some 
“leading IPR experts” joined members of the GSM-5 to 
establish the Intellectual Property Rights Committee 
(IPRC), initiating a 5+ year search for new IPR-
procedures during which ETSI consistently sought a 
high degree of detail, while arguing the need to reduce 
the uncertainty that lurked in the IPR question. 
In the following, some of the major events in this quest 
and the dispute it raised will be presented. In this 
presentation, two extreme positions that  shaped the 
debate will be identified—one in favor of compulsory 
licensing of IPRs, one in favor of no rules. We will see 
that the attempt to reach comprimise between these 
original positions can be divided into two basic stages, 
each ending with the tentative approval of  an IPR policy 
(in 1993 and 1994).  Before turning to the evolution of 
that discussion, we present the basic aspects of the 
opposing positions.  
A. The Compulsory Licensing Position 
Compulsory licensing was the original tact taken by 
the IPRC. It involved a multilateral contractual 
arrangement that detailed the obligation of all 
members to license any potentially “essential” IPR it 
or any of its affiliates might hold to any other 
member. Varying degrees of this licensing obligation 
were presented in the course of the debate, with the 
most workable from ETSI’s point of view but most 
controversial involving unconditional licensing.  Such 
a ‘technology pooling’ approach is not unheard of in 
forums which are more homogeneous in terms of 
nature and size of IPR portfolios. Notably, it is similar 
to the approach some individual equipment industries 
employ when standardizing for themselves in industry 
consortia (e.g. ATM-Forum). In the bylaws of these 
para-standardization organizations, the exercise of 
IPRs may be bindingly defined in the form of a 
multilateral contract. 
 
Unlike its parent CEPT, ETSI however housed a 
diversity of interest.  In line with the uneven 
distribution of IPRs among ETSI members, 
compulsory licensing has been most strongly 
advocated by those with the greatest discrepancy 
between their IPR needs and their IPR portfolios. The 
case has been put perhaps most directly by the Italian 
Conglomerate STET-Group which at the time 
included both the monopoly manufacturer and the 
TNO. This group sponsored a review of pertinent 
legal conditions surrounding ETSI, arguing that, by 
the definition of ETSI’s mission and by its 
classification as an ‘association’ under French Law, 
IPRs should be made freely available to ETSI 
members. This compulsory licensing interpretation 
had been controversial both in terms of legal 
                                                                                        
observers indicate that ETSI tended to over-react to 
Motorola and other equipment-makers move away 
from established licensing practices. This controversy 
is discussed in Iversen, 1999 
interpretation, but moreover, for pragmatic political 
reasons. 
B. Laissez-faire position 
The contrary position insisted that the IPR-procedures 
be minimal. This position was advocated by a 
“minority alliance” of primarily North American 
manufacturers. Together, this minority alliance 
comprised 12% of ETSI when weighed according to 
the institute’s voting rules in 1994, but represented a 
far greater percentage of the total IPRs claimed by 
ETSI members. Despite the IPRC’s steady movement 
away from the Compulsory licensing approach, this 
group consistently rejected detailed procedural 
provisions for dealing with emerging IPR conflicts. 
Instead, the alliance argued consistently for the 
minimal procedural guidelines of the type that prevails 
in other SDOs, notably ISO and IEC as well as 
CCITT (now ITU-T). In doing so, this contingent has 
uncompromisingly championed the individual 
holder’s rights to exercise its IPRs without restriction. 
 
European manufactures typically did not follow such 
a hard line despite their alignment on certain aspects. 
Instead, the Europeans were generally in favor of an 
IPR policy that allowed the IPR-holder to reserve its 
rights not to license only in exceptional cases but 
confirmed his general commitment to do so in the 
common interest of European standardization. In the 
words of a European manufacturer, the question was 
whether, “a member really wants to use his resources 
to search for patents with the aim to create obstacles 
to European standardization”. [Interview] Noting their 
reliance on standards to gain access to the formative 
EU market and their wish to gain as much of the 
international market as well, European manufacturers 
have strong interests not to allow their US rivals to 
reserve the right to create such obstacles.  
C. The indemnity issue 
In addition to dealing with internal conflicts, there is a 
second set of broad concerns that the IRPC faced. The 
so-called Indemnity question involves what 
procedures are to be followed if an ETSI standard 
infringed an IPR holder who is not a member of the 
institute. In short, the question is who bears the 
burden of third party infringement, should it appear. 
Say a manufacturer builds equipment for a TNO based 
on an ETSI standard, whereupon it is discovered that 
that equipment infringes the IPRs of a third party; 
who is the liable party? Does the manufacturer or does 
the TNO carry the costs of this situation? Or should 
this be the responsibility of the institute? In the early 
stages of the IPRC negotiations, this indemnity 
question became a serious sticking point in the 
negotiations. In particular, it took on the aspect of a 
central area of disagreement between TNOs and 
manufacturers and, in general, threatened to hold up 
the further progress towards an IPR policy. In order to 
expedite the process as a whole, this concern was set 
aside until after the internal procedures had been 
accepted and implemented. This issue helps explain 
why both the 1993 and, after it was abandoned, the 
1994 policies had long been “interim policies”.  
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF ETSI’S IPR-APPROACH 
ETSI’s search for IPR-procedures is divided into two 
phases: before and after the 1993 Policy & 
Undertaking were abandoned. The stages 
corresponding to the run up to the initial approval of 
this policy and the subsequent abandonment of it and 
the approval in1994 of a policy can together be 
divided into five stages of negotiations. In the 
following, we will trace the discussion from its first 
phase, characterized by ‘the compulsory licensing 
approach’, through the ‘crown-jewel exception’ 
approach to the ‘licensing-by-default’ position of the 
1993 Policy and Undertaking, followed by attempts at 
reconciliation and, finally, the abandonment of the 
Undertaking. The timeline below points out several 
major events in this evolution.  
 
Table: Timeline of major events in ETSI’s search for a 
‘new approach’ to the IPR-question  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1989 1992 1993 1994 
Committee on IPR issues 
(GSM-5)  
EC- Commission 
Communication on 
Standardization and IPRs 
 
Approval of the 1993 IPR 
Policy and Undertaking 
(March) 
 
IPR-Committee presents its 
report 
 ETSI seeks ‘negative 
clearance’ under EC 
Competition rules 
CBEMA lodges a formal 
Complaint with the 
Commission (June) 
Extraordinary meeting on 
IPRs in ETSI 
   Adoption of an adjusted IPR 
Policy without Undertaking 
Transition from the 
“Compulsory-Licensing” to 
the “Crown-Jewel” 
Approach 
 
Arrival at the “Licensing-by-
default “ Approach 
Uncertain Consensus 
A. Phase 1: Compulsory Licensing 
In the first phase, IPRC’s original proposal was that of 
a straight licensing obligation. If an 'essential' IPR 
arose, the "owner or controller" would be obliged to 
license on acceptable terms. This clearly favored 
PTTs, with their typically limited R&D budgets and 
limited IPR portfolios as against their enormous 
demand for technology. For manufacturers, both the 
large ones who had collected expansive portfolios and 
small ones who held only a few that were central to 
their business, this approach was clearly not in 
keeping with their interests. 
 
The trajectory of this approach lends credence to 
claims made by CBEMA in its later Complaint, that 
ETSI's Policy attempted to lay the groundwork for a 
"PTT intellectual property pool". Compulsive 
licensing, by effectively making any technology 
available to the Public Network Operators, would be 
somewhat in keeping with the PTT oriented 
standardization model predating of the Monopoly-
Providers Paradigm. Their IPR needs would in such a 
situation continue to be catered to. The effects of such 
an approach can be summed up in the words of that 
Green Paper: "Although it could be argued that 
consumers would benefit in the short term if IPRs 
were compulsively licensed to serve as the basis of 
standards, in the long term, investment in R&D would 
dry up within the Community." [CEC COM (92) 445 
final] 
B. Phase 2: The ‘Crown Jewel' Exception 
With an eye on balancing the aims of standardization 
with those IPR holders, the IPRC probably opted to 
begin at the extreme SDO end of the scale as part of a 
negotiation strategy. In this case, the second stage 
predictably represents concessions, both to its CEC 
'counselor', and to the IPR holding interests. Here the 
IPR holder was granted the right to bow out of his 
obligations under the claim that a particular IPR was 
central to its business (a.k.a. ‘crown jewel’) and that 
the obligation to license would undermine the player’s 
business. Such exceptions could occur only in 
exceptional cases.  
 
However, key uncertainties of precisely what would 
constitute an "exceptional case", and questions of how 
efficient the application for the implied clearance 
would be, point to just a couple of a whole field of 
relevant issues here. The problem of definitions in 
general has dogged attempts to institute a detailed 
procedure on this front. Besides the precise meaning 
of 'essential IPRs', other points of uncertainty include 
the related questions of who is to arbitrate, under what 
jurisdiction, what conditions, et al. The salient point 
here, however, was that by opening the compulsory 
licensing approach to exceptions the potential 
workability of such a policy receded considerably. 
This is another good reason why the IPRC originally 
took a strong compulsory-licensing approach. In terms 
of the "crown jewel" approach, that otherwise 
introduced some balance was ultimately abandoned in 
negotiations that included the Commission. 
C. Phase 3: the "licensing by default system" 
The approach that was finally approved in 1993 
moved considerably further towards the IPR-holders’ 
interests. Here, the IPR owner/controller was 
permitted to withhold licenses on an "unlimited" basis, 
pursuant to procedural conditions. In return, affected 
IPR 'owners/controllers' were to be required to 
conduct searches of their IPR files and those of their 
affiliates (subsidiaries) over which they might control 
and to notify ETSI of any essential IPRs it may wish 
to exempt within an expanded 180 day period.  This 
crucial period was to be reckoned, "from the time 
when the scope of the work item relating to the future 
standard in question is sufficiently clearly defined for 
the IPR holders to perform a meaningful search." [IPR 
Undertaking, 1993] 
 
This compromise solution nicknamed the “license by 
default” approach, was finally adopted in March 1993 
when it received a 88% majority [note: the alliance’s 
12%] which was well above the 71% required.  This 
was expressly an interim measure that was approved. 
The Undertaking at that point stipulated a period of 
two-four year trial period during which the Approach 
could be assessed and adapted in such a way as to 
allow both persistent points of contention and arising 
ones to be solved.  
 
There were four unresolved points of contention that 
remained.  These were the (i.) the 180 day intellectual 
property rights search; (ii.) the patent applications 
area; (iii.) Arbitration; and (iv.) terms of licensing.  
The death of the 1993 IPR-Undertaking 
These same unresolved points corresponded to the 
four points that ETSI found  'essential' about the 
Undertaking.  As a result of both formal and informal 
protests, the IPR Policy was not instituted despite 
having majority support.  The reasons for this 
included the following factors; 
 
• CBEMA (digital, IBM, AT&T, Phillips; Motorola 
as observer) launched a Complaint [Case No. 
IV/34.760 -CBEMA v ETSI 4] before the 
                                                          
                                                                                        
4 The Complaint was lodged on 22 June 1993. It 
alleged that ETSI's contravened the Treaty of Rome’s 
Commission claiming that ETSI’s approach to 
IPRs contravened European competition law. The 
CBEMA COMPLAINT drew strength from 
claims that ETSI intended to flush the dissenters 
out of the institute. This was a claim that was the 
centerpiece for its argument that ETSI’s IPR 
Approach was at heart competition distorting. 
• A “phenomenal” intensity of American lobbying 
was mobilized on all fronts to hinder the ‘93 
policy from being implemented. This policy 
became the subject of trade negotiations between 
Kantor and Bangemann over which the idea of 
trade war loomed; the US Dept of Justice started 
to put together a case; while Clinton is reputed to 
have pressured the British Government into 
subtracting support for the policy through threats 
of moving certain industrial plants from the UK. 
At the same time, American embassies are said to 
have exerted pressure on certain voting parties to 
get them to withdraw support. 
• ETSI received between 12-14 letters from parties 
(i.e. greater than the number of CBEMA-
members represented) who threatened to pull out 
of ETSI if it implemented the 1993 Policy. 
 
Together these circumstances sent the search for an 
IPR policy into an extra round. This extra-round was 
designed to find a “pragmatic” solution somewhere 
between the polarities described. The bone of 
contention was part II of the ‘93 Approach, the 
Undertaking. In the shadow of the pending CBEMA 
complaint an IPR Special Committee (IPRSC) was set 
up to try and reach consensus on the four contentious 
points. This has been described as a futile exercise, 
where the majority was forced to cede to the 
minority’s strategy to prioritize their individual patent 
portfolio considerations at the cost of the wider 
interest of ETSI standardization. The CBEMA 
Complaint stands as the factor that effectively 
suppressed implementation of ETSI's hopeful 'license 
by default' system. In view of this effect it, " has been 
seen by some as an inappropriate use of the 
Commission's procedures, and CBEMA members are 
accused of seeking to prolong and overturn the debate 
they lost in ETSI's General Assembly." [Tuckett, 
1993] The Complaint, whatever its intentions, has 
indeed had this effect. 
The Commission Position 
It should be noted that ETSI had concurrently sought 
"negative clearance" under REG NO 17. 2, pursuant 
to which the "Commission (might) certify that, on the 
basis of the facts in its possession, there are no 
grounds under art 85. 1/or 86 of the Treaty for action 
Competition regime under (art 85-6). Procedurewise, 
its recourse was through Regulation 17/62/EEC which 
regulates the implementation of 85/86, under Reg. 17. 
3 or that Regulation's 'termination of infringements' 
article. 
on its part in respect of an agreement, decision or 
practice." [Art 2: emphasis added]. Apparently this 
was on 25 November 1992 at which time the 
Commission concluded that the facts it possessed 
were not sufficient to make a decision. 
 
Importantly, the Commission had opened for the sort 
of the 'license by default system' finally approved by 
ETSI under its competition provisions. However it 
stipulated strongly that this agreement grant IPR 
holders the 'genuine possibility' to withhold his IPRs. 
The Commission found at that time that it could not 
discern whether this central criterion was satisfied by 
ETSI's Approach. The CBEMA Complaint stepped in 
the breach 10 months later to provide examples that 
indicted ETSI on this count. The argument indicated 
that this criterion would not be fulfilled due to the fact 
that the "meaningful searches" for IPRs could not be 
successfully conducted by the holders given the 
insufficiently detailed information that the SDO 
could/would make available to the market. Further, 
the complexity of the search process especially for a 
multinational company, all of whose affiliates fall 
under the Policy's purview, must also be factored in.  
 
According to the DGIV preliminary report, ETSI had 
acknowledged its shortcomings in making enough 
information available to potential IPR holders. This 
kind of information is of course integral to the 
question as it is based on the provision of sufficient 
information starts the 180 IP search period. If that 
clock starts running before an IPR holder can 
adequately determine if he has any relevant IPRs 
either on the books or, more delicately, under 
application, then his 'genuine possibility' to withhold 
his patents et al. is not being honored. That is the 
'crucial competition issue' from the point of view of 
DGIV: ETSI's interpretation of CEC signals on this 
question is that, pending the improvement on the 
information mechanism, "(it) seems ready to give the 
green light to this provision, even if the search process 
is somewhat burdensome for the members." [ETSI's 
interpretation, Feb. 1994] Notwithstanding, other 
issues remained. In addition to the 180-day IP search 
provisions, The Commission considered the questions 
of Monetary compensation, standards application area 
and arbitration in terms of their impact on 
competition.  
D. The fourth phase: towards consensus 
Each of the main points of contention---180 day 
search; -Standards Area of Application; -Arbitration 
and -licensing terms--- was hotly contested up to the 
approval of the first IPR Policy/Undertaking and 
afterwards. In particular, the Standards Application 
Area represented a deeply intractable issue, and 
divided those with Europe as home markets against 
the ’alliance’ of multinationals. In this scenario, the 
Europeans were strongly interested in “exporting 
standards” outside of the CEPT area. By defining the 
SAA as broadly as possible, PNOs could broaden the 
stock of suppliers to any country where GSM 
standards were employed without fear of blocking 
IPR, while European manufacturers could likewise 
extend their markets on the same scale.  
 
Not surprisingly, the North American “alliance” was 
not willing to obligate itself to license IPRs on what 
could potentially spread to a global scale while 
including their home market. If, as seems to be the 
case with the DCS ‘delta-specs’, a European standard 
finds its way to the US and a US company controls 
essential IPRs on it, other US companies would be 
forced to negotiate through ETSI. Both for tactical 
reasons and for historical ones (standards wars have 
not been rare between the US and CEPT: see ISDN or 
HDTV), this has been unacceptable to the ‘alliance’ 
companies.  In the final analysis, their sustained 
disagreement with such an approach became echoed 
in the CBEMA case, the Kantor-Bangemann talks, 
and at higher diplomatic levels as noted. 
 
The work of the IPRSC showed some progress on at 
least two of the contentious issues by June 1994. 
However, already in March of that year its work and 
with it the ‘93 policy was declared dead because there 
simply was no possible way to reach a viable 
consensus on the standards application area question. 
In particular, Alcatel saw this and saw too that the 
IPR-SC was going in the wrong direction in trying to 
cater to the ‘minority interest’. Therefore, the IPRSC’s 
mandate was by popular request not extended, despite 
its avowed progress. At this point, the proposition was 
forwarded by Alcatel that the contentious Undertaking 
be dropped from the Policy and the non-contentious, 
non-controversial Part I Policy be revised slightly to 
fit ETSI’s special character. It is remarkable that about 
the same proportion (over 80%) that had supported 
the ‘93 APPROACH, turned around in the fall of ‘94 
and voted it out. Incentives to find such a solution had 
become stronger and stronger. Although, the CEC 
(DG IV) preliminary position in the CBEMA Case 
indicated in principle the strength of ETSI’s position, 
ETSI’s potential to win the case became irrelevant in 
the face of unrelenting opposition.  
 
Meanwhile, it was argued that the IPR controversy 
was damaging ETSI’s legitimacy in the market. In 
general it should be noted that such a situation is 
serious for a relatively new SDO that is trying to 
establish itself in a quickly changing global market. 
There were more specific circumstances that this 
comment played on however. More recently, the US 
reserved the 1900 MHz bandwidth for mobile PCN 
applications, opening for the possibility of adapting 
sections of the GSM patents (i.e. the DCS 1800 delta 
specs noted above). The prospects of exporting a 
European standard to the US would carry not only 
competitive advantage for European companies that 
had pioneered the GSM standards into this coveted 
market but it would also give the EU’s reputation a 
boost as well. 
1994 Approach 
The Approach that was approved in November 1994 
represents a return towards the “Normal Procedure” 
SDOs have traditionally applied when handling the 
potential IPR conflicts. The ETSI approach 
distinguishes itself in several important respects from, 
for example the self avowedly minimalist ITU’s Code 
of Practice, though not radically and thus not 
contentiously so. The bone of contention was simply 
jettisoned from the 93 Approach as a pragmatic move 
to end the dispute. 
The 1994 Policy obligates Members to inform ETSI 
of “essential”, IPRs that they “become aware of” 
though, importantly they have no obligation to search 
for these. The idea is that IPR holders are keenly 
aware of their “crown jewels” patents and would 
immediately recognize if one of these were implicated 
in an evolving standard. He would have a “bona fide” 
obligation to declare the IPR(s) and, moreover, 
whether or not he is willing to license on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms: the choice 
not to license would have to be backed up by a written 
declaration. The bona fide obligation seems sufficient 
in this situation because an IPR-holder would have 
trouble convincing others members who are eager for 
a standard that he was unaware of an IPR which, 
when it finally came to his attention, shows itself to be 
so important that he is reluctant to license. Therefore 
potential conflicts would, unlike in the GSM case, 
emerge early in the shaping of a standard, giving ETSI 
at least some time to react. 
 
If it was only realized after the standard was formed 
that a member held an essential IPR, it would be 
assumed that the importance of that IPR could not be 
important enough to the holder that he would 
undermine the common interest of standardization by 
refusing to license. Such a situation is technically 
allowable under the new Policy, but it would call 
one’s commitment to the process seriously into doubt. 
This is a serious disincentive. “Good faith” plays an 
important role in the positive-sum standardization 
forum where other more overt forms of coercion lack. 
In the GSM case, the effect of this mechanism can be 
seen in that the market began to turn away Motorola 
when allegations of its unwillingness to license GSM 
were most rampant and most negative. Motorola 
claims to have lost a lot of business due to what it 
terms “lies” and says that it had even considered 
lodging libel suits against some.  
 
It should noted by way of closing, that a defining 
aspect about the policy is its direct references to the 
CEC. These references touch on the ETSI-specific 
potential that a blocking IPR emerges in the case of 
“mandatory standards”. In such cases, the CEC will 
underwrite the laborious IPR searches in order to 
locate potentially ‘essential’ IPRs, a compromise one 
of the 5 year dispute’s difficult topics. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The exceptional proportions attained by this 
controversy testify to the importance of the 
relationship between SDOs and IPRs in the changing 
ICT-field. Since the ETSI’s departed from normal 
practices to find a new approach to the IPR-problem 
which addressed the challenges of the ‘new 
environment’, several IPR-disputes have emerged 
both within ETSI and without. Today, there is general 
consensus that one has entered into new terrain. Not 
least, the IEEE reevaluated its patent-rights 
procedures in 1994 and, “soon found that the real 
challenge was to make procedures adaptable to a 
changing environment where increasingly more IEEE 
standards projects are being developed around 
patented technology.” [PatCom document, 1996] It 
will be interesting to see if a balance can be 
reestablished between the respective functions of IPR 
regimes and SDOs.  
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